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ABSTRACT
This work addresses challenges related to attacks on social tagging
systems, which often comes in a form of malicious annotations or
profile injection attacks. In particular, we study various countermea-
sures against two types of threats for such systems, the Overload
and the Piggyback attacks. The studied countermeasures include
baseline classifiers such as, Naive Bayes filter and Support Vector
Machine, as well as a deep learning-based approach. Our evaluation
performed over synthetic spam data, generated from del.icio.us,
shows that in most cases, the deep learning-based approach pro-
vides the best protection against threats.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recommender Systems (RS) are information filtering mechanisms,
aiming at predicting the preference of users to particular resources.
Social Tagging systems, facilitate resource recommendations using
the users’ assigned annotations to resources, (aka folksonomies), as
input to prediction algorithms. The novelty of using tags for an-
notation has attracted the interest of scientists in RS [1, 2], as well
as of attackers. In general, an attack against a tagging system con-
sists of coordinated malicious profiles that correspond to fictitious
identities, injected into the system, for biasing the recommendation
algorithm towards suggesting inferior products to users.
The issue of security in tag-based RS has so far been mainly ap-
proached using anti-spamming techniques such as, Bayesian type
filtering [8], or other tag classification methods [5]. In the above
works, particular characteristics of the tags used in annotations
are exhibited, with the assumption that tags used by legitimate
users would coincide with each other. Nevertheless, such filtering
becomes ineffective if attackers are aware of the attack filtering
policy [5, 8]. Other feature-based countermeasures, employ either
the neighbors’ honesty within the group [9], or mix features of
tags and users together along with other, derived from the social
connectivity [6]. Neural network-based approaches, including deep
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learning (DL), are known to provide good protection against spam-
ming [3]. However, DL has neither been adequately investigated so
far for safeguarding tag-based RS, nor quantifiable results exist to
show the effectiveness of the countermeasures on the recommen-
dations.
The research question we address is: How effective are the various
classifier schemes against profile injection attacks, that aim to influ-
ence the personalized recommendations in a tag-based RS? To answer
this question, our main goals are: i) to study various classification
schemes, over known types of shilling attacks, and ii) to evaluate
the effectiveness of classification into the recommendation process.
Our contribution in this paper is two fold: i) a synthetic set of
malicious data to serve testing purposes, and ii) a comparative study
of the effects of known attacks and the effectiveness of potential
countermeasures against them, in a typical tag-based RS. Those
include a properly adapted DL model.
2 SECURING THE FOLKSONOMIES
In this work, we focus on two forms of intrusions known asOverload
and Piggyback attacks [7]. The goal of the former is to overload a
tag context with a bogus resource to achieve correlation between
the tag and that resource. To accomplish this, an attacker associates
the bogus resource with a number of popular tags. For the latter,
the objective is the bogus resource to ride the success of another
highly popular one. To achieve that, an attacker would annotate
the bogus resource choosing any popular tags already associated
with the popular one, so that they appear similar. Our comparative
study includes the following algorithms:
Naive Bayes filtering: It is a quite known classifier for detecting
spam emails based on the Bayes theorem, here applied for classify-
ing folksonomies based on the existence of tags in them.
Support Vector Machine (SVM): The input folksonomies were
first vectorized and transformed into TF-IDF values to scale down
the impact of the most frequent tags. Then, they were classified
into legitimate and malicious, using the linear kernel function.
...
...
...
...
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
...
...
Embedding layer
word embedding
vector dimension (25)
50
 v
alu
es
output dimensionality (250)
tag 1
tag 3
tag 2
tag 4
.
.
.
tag 49
tag 50
folksonomy
50
 v
alu
es
L S T M
sigmoid
Dense Layer
ReLU
pa
dd
ed
 fo
lk
so
no
m
y 
to
 si
ze
 5
0
sin
gl
e v
al
ue
Output layer
softmax
for the
probabilities
predicted
legitimate
class
Figure 1: The deep learning model architecture used
Deep Learning (DL):We used a hybrid classification model which
employs a Long-Short-Term-Memory (LSTM)-based Recurrent Neu-
ral Network and works both with and without sequential data. It
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is composed of four layers (see Fig.1): a) an Embedding layer with
size relevant to the vocabulary of tags used in the folksonomies
(set to 25), b) a hidden layer, fully connected to the input and the
subsequent layer, with dimensionality of its outer space set to 250,
based on preliminary results, c) a dense layer, used for improving the
learning and stabilize the output, of size equal to the input folkson-
omy, and d) a single neuron output layer provides the classification
output in the form of probabilities for the Legitimate class.
3 EXPERIMENTS
To demonstrate the effects of the attacks on the recommendations,
we employed Vector Space, a legacy algorithm for personalized rec-
ommendations in tag-based RS, which we adapted to our particular
case. First, we express every tag in the corpus as word2vec vector
by Google’s pre-trained set. Next, every user-posted folksonomy is
represented by a single vector, by averaging the word2vec values of
all tags in that folksonomy. As such, every user, or resource acquires
its own vector representation, by combining together all folkson-
omy vectors associated with them. Finally, the personalized top-k
recommendations for a user is build using the Cosine Similarity of
his vector and the resourses’ vectors.
3.1 Dataset and Evaluation Metrics
For every run in our evaluation we selected randomly subsets of 3k
users from del.icio.us dataset, corresponding to 73k folksonomies
that form corpuses of 42k different tags. Due to lack of pre-labeled
bogus data, we built synthetic bogus folksonomies of size and tag
content determined according to guidelines found in the litera-
ture [7]. As such, to simulate the Overload attack, the tags of the
fake folksonomies were chosen out of the 75 most popular ones
used in the legitimate folksonomies, while the max size of the fake
ones was limited to 50 tags. The actual size of a fake folksonomy
was chosen so that, legitimate and fake ones will follow the same
distribution. The popular tags were selected from those used for
annotating the most popular resources. The impact of the attacks is
demonstrated via a set of approved metrics [7] we adopted, which
are: 1) the F-Score for the spam classification, 2) the Avg. rank of
the bogus resource in the users’ top-k lists, and 3) the population
affected by the attack, (users been recommended a bogus resource).
For the Piggyback attack, the last metric refers to users for whom
the bogus resource has been ranked higher than the popular one.
3.2 Experimental Setup
For training the classifiers we appended 30% fake synthetic folk-
sonomies onto the set of legitimate ones. For the testing, we chose
variable attack size, ranging from 0.1% to 10%, which refers to the
ratio of the fake folksonomies over the legitimate ones.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of each algorithm, for each
setup, fake folksonomies and legitimate ones were mixed together
and supplied into the vector space model to compile the top-k rec-
ommendations (k was set to 15) for each user, both before and after
applying the countermeasures. For all three filtering algorithms
we tested, we performed 10-fold cross validation over the sample
data. The DL model was implemented in the Keras toolkit, applied
ADAM optimization [4] and selected categorical cross-entropy as the
learning objective. Also, we modeled the input folksonomies (Fig. 1)
in the form of vectors using word-based frequency vectorization.
Finally, the DL model was trained for an optimal number of epochs.
3.3 Results and Discussion
The results are the average values of five runs. DL outperforms
the other approaches (see Table 1) in classifying the legitimate and
Table 1: Classification accuracy for both attacks
Overload Piggyback
F-score SVM BAYES DL SVM BAYES DL
overall 0.9501 0.8339 0.9570 0.9680 0.9009 0.9728
legitimate 0.9665 0.9082 0.9709 0.97888 0.93878 0.9818
bogus 0.8958 0.5863 0.9104 0.9319 0.7748 0.9426
bogus folksonomies, for both attacks. As far as the recommendation
service (see Fig. 2), very interestingly, even attacks of small scale
are enough to render a significant population of users vulnerable.
In fact, the DL approach, in comparison to the other alternatives,
provides in general, good resistance to intrusions of bogus resources
into the users top-k lists, for both attacks. Also, in terms of the Avg.
Rank of the Bogus resource (See Fig. 2, right), DL scales better for
large sizes of attacks vs the Bayes classifier, but performs best for
small attacks only. For the same metric in the piggyback attack, DL
despite being the second best performing, it also does better for
large attacks, as opposed to Bayes classifier.
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Figure 2: The affected population (small values indicate
strong resistance), and the rank of bogus resource (large val-
ues indicate strong resistance)
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we investigated the impact of spam filtering in tag-
based RS. We simulated two known attacks, by generating fake
data from original, taken from del.icio.us. Our experiments showed
that our deep learning model outperforms all the legacy classifiers
in terms of F-score and, in most cases, it can safeguard the user
recommendations. Our future work includes experimentation with
feature extraction from folksonomy data to feed the neural network,
as well as generalizing our results by exploring more datasets.
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